فی موو

مرجع دانلود فایل ,تحقیق , پروژه , پایان نامه , فایل فلش گوشی

فی موو

مرجع دانلود فایل ,تحقیق , پروژه , پایان نامه , فایل فلش گوشی

گیاهان دارویی

اختصاصی از فی موو گیاهان دارویی دانلود با لینک مستقیم و پر سرعت .

گیاهان دارویی


گیاهان دارویی

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

مقاله با عنوان گیاهان دارویی در فرمت ورد در 15 صفحه و شامل مطالب زیر می باشد:

اهمیت - مزیتها - مشکلات - نتیجه
اهمیت
مزیت ها ی گیاهان دارویی برای ایران
پژوهش در صنعت گیاهان دارویی نقطه قوت داروسازی کشور
توصیه
مشکلات صنعت گیاهان دارویی
مهمترین مشکلات توسعة صنعت گیاهان دارویی در کشور
 1-عدم شناخت کافی مسئولین از قابلیت‌های صنعت گیاهان دارویی
2-عدم وجود برنامه جامع ملی
3- پزشکان داخلی تجویز نمی‌کنند و لذا بازار مناسب داخلی به‌وجود نیامده است
4- سیستم توزیع نامناسب (عطاری‌ها)
5- جلوگیری از احداث واحدهای تولیدی در محدوده 120 کیلومتری تهران
6- عملکرد ضعیف برخی از تجار ایرانی
7-ضعف در فناوری فرآوری و تهیه داروهای گیاهی
8- فقدان زیر ساخت‌های مناسب
الف) فقدان قوانین مالکیت فکری
ب) عدم وجود بانک ژن مختص گیاهان دارویی
ج) ضعف در اطلاع رسانی و فرهنگ‌سازی
کلم و تخم کلم
پیاز
نتیجه


دانلود با لینک مستقیم


گیاهان دارویی

دانلود مقاله اشپرینگر و ترجمه با بهترین کیفیت– اینترنت اشیاء – جنبه های امنیتی خانه هوشمند -- SmartHome

اختصاصی از فی موو دانلود مقاله اشپرینگر و ترجمه با بهترین کیفیت– اینترنت اشیاء – جنبه های امنیتی خانه هوشمند -- SmartHome دانلود با لینک مستقیم و پر سرعت .

دانلود مقاله اشپرینگر و ترجمه با بهترین کیفیت– اینترنت اشیاء – جنبه های امنیتی خانه هوشمند -- SmartHome


دانلود مقاله اشپرینگر 2015 و ترجمه با بهترین کیفیت– اینترنت اشیاء – جنبه های امنیتی خانه هوشمند -- Smart Home Security in IoT

 

 

 

 

نوع مطلب: مقاله ترجمه شده با بهترین کیفیت و کاملا تخصصی

سال انتشار: 2015

زبان مقاله: فارسی

قالب مقاله: ورد (Word)

تعداد صفحات: 7 صفحه

محل انتشار: کتاب اشپرینگر دانش کامپیوتر و کاربردهای آن (Computer Science and its applications)

 

 

اطلاعات مقاله انگلیسی:

نوع مطلب: یک فصل از کتاب اشپرینگر

 

سال انتشار: 2015

 

زبان مقاله: انگلیسی

 

قالب مقاله: پی دی اف (PDF)

 

تعداد صفحات: 6 صفحه

محل انتشار: کتاب اشپرینگر دانش کامپیوتر و کاربردهای آن (Computer Science and its applications)

 

دانلود مقاله انگلیسی به صورت رایگان از آدرس زیر:

دریافت مقاله

 

چکیده فارسی:

خانه هوشمند(Smart home) بعنوان یکی از خدمات IOT ( اینترنت اشیا) علاقه بیشتر وبیشتری را به سمت خود جلب میکند. بدلیل توسعه شبکه همراه، گسترش گوشی های هوشمند و افزایش علاقه به امنیت شخصی، بسیاری از سازمانها وارد بازار گوش های هوشمند شده اند. اگر چه، از آنجایی که آنها خدمات خود را بدون توجه به امنیت ارائه میکنند، ممکن است حوادثی در این میان به وقوع بپیوندد. این مقاله، آسیب پذیریهای امنیتی خانه هوشمند را تجزیه و تحلیل کرده و اقدامات امنیتی متقابلی را پیشنهاد میکند.

کلمات کلیدی: خانه هوشمند، امنیت، IOT

 

Abstract

Smarthome as one of IoT(Internet of Things) services is growing more and more interested. Due to the development of mobile network, proliferation of smartphones and increasing of interest for personal safety, many enterprises enter the smartphone market. However, incidents could happen because they provide their services without considering security. This paper analyzes security vulnerabilities of smarthome and proposes countermeasures.

Keywords: Smarthome, Security, IoT

 

 

کلمات کلیدی:

مقاله اشپرینگر اینترنت اشیاء، مقاله الزویر اینترنت اشیاء، حریم خصوصی در اینترنت اشیاء، مقاله سیستم عامل پیشرفته، مقاله سیستم های توزیع شده، مقاله IEEE اینترنت اشیاء، دانلود مقاله اینترنت اشیاء، امنیت در اینترنت اشیاء، امنیت اینترنت اشیاء، چالش های اینترنت اشیاء، چالش های امنیتی اینترنت اشیاء، مقاله 2015 اینترنت اشیاء، مقاله جدید اینترنت اشیاء، مقاله امنیت در اینترنت اشیاء، دانلود پایان نامه اینترنت اشیاء، دانلود پایان نامه کامپیوتر، دانلود پایان نامه انگلیسی کامپیوتر، دانلود پایان نامه رشته کامپیوتر، دانلود پایان نامه کارشناسی ارشد کامپیوتر، اینترنت اشیاء، اینترنت ابزارها، اینترنت چیزها، مقاله آی اس آی، مقاله ای اس ای، مقاله آی اس آی 2015، مقاله isi 2015، مقاله رشته کامپیوتر، مقاله اینترنت اشیاء، پایان نامه اینترنت اشیاء، چالش های اینترنت اشیاء، مقاله 2015 اینترنت اشیاء، مقاله انگلیسی ترجمه شده، مقاله کامپیوتر ترجمه شده، مقاله اینترنت اشیاء ترجمه شده، مقاله ترجمه شده جدید اینترنت اشیاء، مقاله ترجمه شده جدید، مقاله با ترجمه، مقاله ISI با ترجمه، سرویس های ابری اینترنت اشیاء، مقیاس پذیری سرویس های ابری اینترنت اشیاء، گسترش پذیری اینترنت اشیاء، 2015 Article, ISI Article, IoT Thesis, Internet of things, IoT Cloud Services, Scalability in Internet of Things Cloud Services, Security in internet of things 

 

 

 

 

پس از خرید از درگاه امن بانکی لینک دانلود در اختیار شما قرار میگیرد و همچنین به آدرس ایمیل شما فرستاده میشود.

 

تماس با ما برای راهنمایی، درخواست مقالات و پایان نامه ها و یا ترجمه با آدرس ایمیل:

ArticleEbookFinder@gmail.com

 

شماره تماس ما در نرم افزار واتس آپ:

آیکون نرم افزار واتس آپ+98 921 764 6825

شماره تماس ما در نرم افزار تلگرام:

تماس با ما+98 921 764 6825 

 

 

 توجه: اگر کارت بانکی شما رمز دوم ندارد، در خرید الکترونیکی به مشکل برخورد کردید و یا به هر دلیلی تمایل به پرداخت الکترونیکی ندارید با ما تماس بگیرید تا راههای دیگری برای پرداخت به شما پیشنهاد کنیم.

 

 

 

 

 


دانلود با لینک مستقیم


دانلود مقاله اشپرینگر و ترجمه با بهترین کیفیت– اینترنت اشیاء – جنبه های امنیتی خانه هوشمند -- SmartHome

ریسک و بازده

اختصاصی از فی موو ریسک و بازده دانلود با لینک مستقیم و پر سرعت .

ریسک و بازده


ریسک و بازده

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

مقاله با عنوان ریسک و بازده در فرمت ورد و شامل ترجمه متن زیر می باشد:

Risk and Return
The art of "investing" is defined by risk and return. An investor is willing to assume a certain amount of risk as a trade-off to getting paid an expected return. It is quite important for any person, prior to jumping into the stock market, to understand the different types of risk and how to measure them. As we will see, some types can be circumvented through diversification, while others cannot. Be sure you are getting paid for the added risk you take!
When an investor buys a security (stock, bond, mutual fund, artwork, etc) they have a certain "expected return." Some investors may quantify this number as a percentage, while others just hope for some sort of positive return. Expected return is mathematically defined as income + capital appreciation. Certain stocks, generally in the technology sector, do not pay any income (dividends) because they reinvest all profits in their business. In the case of these (growth) stocks, your expected return is strictly capital appreciation. Keep in mind that investing is a two-way street between the investor and the company you are investing in. If you buy a stock position in a company (or a bond from them) they have to give you an adequate reward for doing so or you'll invest elsewhere. Thus, the "required return" is what will induce an investor to invest in an asset, given that asset's level of risk. There are a few types of risk:
systematic risk- this is risk which cannot be diversified. When you buy a security it is subject to the following unpredictable factors which may affect (either positively or negatively) your return on investment: interest rate risk, reinvestment rate risk, market risk, exchange rate risk, and purchasing power (inflation) risk. There is nothing you can do to protect an individual stock from an inflationary period. Please note that even though you cannot prevent these risks, there are still ways to hedge them. An example would be buying a floating rate mortgage security to protect a stock which may tend to perform negatively in a rising interest-rate environment.
unsystematic risk- this component of risk can be diversified by having a "portfolio" of securities. Diversifiable risks include business risk, financial risk, and country risk. For example, if you have $10,000 and buy a homebuilding stock with it, you are not diversifying your risks. If the overall stock market goes up, but the housing sector slows down, your stock will underperform the overall market. Many investment professionals believe that owning a basket of roughly 10-15 stocks in different sectors can eliminate most of the unsystematic risk.
The most important measure of a security's risk is its standard deviation. This is a statistical measure of the historical volatility of a portfolio of securities, usually figured with a 5, or 10-year return. In simpler terms, standard deviation is a measure of how much investment returns tend to fluctuate around their average. To compute standard deviation, you need to write down the % return each year for a specific stock or mutual fund. You then add them all up and divide by the number of securities you are using. This will give you the "mean" or average return of the portfolio over a period of time. You subtract the mean from each annual return and then square it. You add up all these squared numbers, divide by the number of years, and take the square root. This will give you the "standard deviation." A portfolio will move within 1 standard deviation (whatever the number is) 68% of the time. It will move within 2 standard deviations 98% of the time. This is an important way to assess potential risk and return from a portfolio of securities. Check out this profile page from yahoo.com which goes into the statistical measure of “risk.”

Risk

Risk means the probability that you will lose money on an investment. A more technical definition of risk is the volatility of return on the investment. An asset with erratic returns is considered riskier than an asset whose value is static or moves slowly.
Few investments are risk-free. Investing in stocks, in particular, means accepting some level of risk. If you want to make a killing in the stock market, you are going to have to take risks. If you keep all your life savings in safe investments such as a savings account, you will face virtually no risk, but your returns will be small, and inflation will eat away at the value of your deposit.
There is a trade-off between risk and return. Less risk means less return, while taking on more risk brings the possibility of a higher return.
Levels of risk are a personal decision. They may be affected by your age, investment goals, time of life and how much you can afford to lose.
Types of risk
There are two types of risks to consider when investing in the stock market - the market risk and unique risks.
Market risk
The values of individual stocks often tend to move in the same general direction as the overall market. And it is unusual for individual stocks to move markedly against the movement of the FTSE 100. That's because they are all driven by the same factors that affect the overall health of the economy (inflation, interest rates, GNP figures, etc). There is obviously a risk that the market overall could fall. That is called the market risk.
Unique risk
Unique risk is specific to a particular stock. For example, if a car manufacturer's production is disrupted by a strike, it would be a source of unique risk because it would only affect that particular manufacturer. Other sources of unique risk include mistakes by company management, new inventions by a competing company and law suits.


Risk and return
In general terms, the riskier an investment, the higher return an investor should expect for taking on that risk.
An investment risk is the possibility that the security (stock or bond) will default or depreciate significantly in value. But in order to assess just what return is required to compensate you for taking a risk, you need to work from a benchmark rate. This rate is known as the risk-free rate.
Risk-free rate
The risk-free rate usually corresponds to the rate available on a risk-free investment. In most cases it corresponds to the rate paid on long-term government bonds, which are considered relatively risk-free.
Risk premiums
The risk premium is essentially the reward an investor expects for taking on risk. This premium depends on the amount a security can be expected to deviate from its purchase price.
Risk-adjusted return
Higher-risk investments (such as small-cap stocks) can be expected to be far more volatile than a government bond, so investors will expect a return - for example, 15% - greater than the risk-free rate.
If a government bond provides a return of 5%, then the risk-adjusted return for the higher-risk investment is 15% - 5% = 10%.
Risk-adjusted returns are not quoted anywhere because they are theoretical, but try to apply the concept when making investment decisions. Estimate the risk-adjusted return by comparing the investment return you are looking at with a risk-free return. Then you need to decide if that return is adequate compensation for taking on the risk.
Reducing risk
Unique risk
Diversification can reduce the unique risks of individual investments. That means spreading your money over a number of investments.
Market risk
Diversifying your portfolio will not eliminate market risk. You may be able to reduce market risk by switching your money into less risky investments such as government or savings bonds, but you will have to settle for lower returns.





Risk and Return
•    A security's return is often measured by its holding-period return: the change in price plus any income received, expressed as a percentage of the original price. A better measure would take into account the timing of dividends or other payments, and the rates at which they are reinvested.
•    The total return on an investment has two components: the expected return and the unexpected return. The unexpected return comes about because of unanticipated events. The risk from investing stems from the possibility of an unanticipated event.
•    The total risk of a security refers to the extent to which realized returns may deviate from the expected return. A common measure is standard deviation, although for many investors the downside risk is more important than the sheer dispersion of returns. For funds managers, the risk of underperforming a benchmark may be the most relevant risk.
•    If one assumes returns are nomally distributed, then variance (or its square root, standard deviation) is a reasonable measure of risk, since a normal distribution is symmetrical and fully described by its expected value and variance. There is evidence that stock-price returns are more leptokurtic (fat-tailed) than would be predicted by the standard normal distribution.
•    Systematic risks (also called market risks) are unanticipated events that affect almost all assets to some degree because the effects are economywide. Unsystematic risks are unanticipated events that affect single assets or small groups of assets. Unsystematic risks are also called unique or asset-specific risks.
•    Investors face a trade-off between risk and expected return. Historical data confirm our intuition that assets with low degrees of risk provide lower returns on average than do those of higher risk.
•    Shifting funds from the risky portfolio to the risk-free asset is the simplest way to reduce risk. Another method involves diversification of the risky portfolio.
•    U.S. T-bills provide a perfectly risk-free asset in nominal terms only. Nevertheless, the standard deviation of real rates on short-term T-bills is small compared to that of assets such as long-term bonds and common stocks, so for the purpose of our analysis, we consider T-bills the risk-free asset. Besides T-bills, money market funds hold short-term safe obligations such as commercial paper and CDs. These entail some default risk but relatively little compared to most other risky assets. For convenience, we often refer to money market funds as risk-free assets.
•    A risky investment portfolio (referred to here as the risky asset) can be characterized by its reward-to-variability ratio. This ratio is the slope of the capital allocation line (CAL), the line that goes from the risk-free asset through the risky asset. All combinations of the risky and risk-free assets lie on this line. Investors would prefer a steeper sloping CAL, because that means higher expected returns for any level of risk. If the borrowing rate is greater than the lending rate, the CAL will be "kinked" at the point corresponding to investment of 100% of the complete portfolio in the risky asset.
•    An investor's preferred choice among the portfolios on the capital allocation line will depend on risk aversion. Risk-averse investors will weight their complete portfolios more heavily toward Treasury bills. Risk-tolerant investors will hold higher proportions of their complete portfolios in the risky asset.
•    The capital market line is the capital allocation line that results from using a passive investment strategy that treats a market index portfolio such as the Standard & Poor's 500 as the risky asset. Passive strategies are low-cost ways of obtaining well-diversified portfolios with performance close to that of the market as a whole.
Interest Rate Risk
•    Even default-free bonds such as Treasury issues are subject to interest rate risk. Longer term bonds generally are more sensitive to interest rate shifts than short-term bonds. A measure of the average life of a bond is Macaulay's duration, defined as the weighted average of the times until each payment made by the security, with weights proportional to the present value of the payment.
•    Macauley's duration measures the time horizon when a bond's yield will be realized. During that time, losses (gains) from price change will be offset by gains (losses) from reinvestment of coupon interest.
•    Modified Duration is a direct measure of the sensitivity of a دوره دوام bond's price to a change in its yield. Modified Duration is equal to Macauley's Duration/(1+yield).
•    Duration is only an approximation of the percentage price change of a bond for a 1% change in yield. It assumes parallel changes in a flat yield curve, and only works for small changes (such as 10 basis points) in yield.
•    The longer the maturity, the lower the yield, and the smaller and less frequent the bond's coupon, the greater is the duration. The Macauley's duration of a zero-coupon bond is equal to its maturity.
•    Convexity measures the degree to which duration changes as the yield to maturity changes.
•    Positive convexity, which characterizes most straight (plain, non-callable) bonds, refers to the fact that price sensitivity, as measured by duration, declines as the yield increases, and rises as the yield decreases. Positive convexity is regarded as a desirable feature of a bond, particularly when yields are volatile. Callable bonds such as US mortgage-backed securities have negative convexity over some yield range.
•    Duration is additive, so the duration of a portfolio of bonds is the weighted sum of the duration of the individual bonds. Because duration and convexity measure price risk, they can be helpful in bond portfolio management.
•    Immunization strategies are characteristic of passive fixed-income portfolio management. Such strategies attempt to render the individual or firm immune from movements in interest rates. This may take the form of immunizing net worth or, instead, immunizing the future accumulated value of a fixed-income portfolio. Immunization of a fully funded plan is accomplished by matching the durations of assets and liabilities. To maintain an immunized position as time passes and interest rates change, the portfolio must be periodically rebalanced.
•    A more direct form of immunization is dedication or cash flow matching. If a portfolio is perfectly matched in cash flow with projected liabilities, rebalancing will be unnecessary.
Quantifying Credit Risk
•    For many years, academics and financial insitutions have sought to predict losses from credit risk. The best-known methodogy is based on Altman's Z-score, which seeks to predicts defaults using company financial data.
•    The newer CreditMetrics approach estimates volatility from upgrades, downgrades, and defaults. Historical data are used to attribute a likelihood of possible credit events, including upgrades and downgrades, not just defaults.
•    For example, CreditMetrics calculates the probability that a bond’s current rating will shift to any other rating within a given time. Each shift results in an estimated change in value (derived from historical credit spread data or recovery rates in default). Each value out-come is weighted by its likelihood to create a distribution of value across each credit state, from which each asset’s expected value and volatility of value is computed.
•    To compute the volatility of portfolio value from the volatility of individual asset values requires estimates of correlation in credit quality changes. Since these cannot be directly observed from historical data, one approach is to infer these from historical asset correlation data derived from equity price series. Several different approaches, including a simple constant correlation, can be used.



The dimensions of Risk Capacity™ can be broken down into five categories defined as follows.
10.2.1 Five Dimensions of Risk Capacity™
Dimension 1: Time Horizon and Liquidity Needs
The Time Horizon and Liquidity Needs dimension estimates how rapidly investors may need to withdraw money from their investments. A low score indicates that an investor may need money in less than two years. A higher score indicates that an investor may not need to withdraw money for ten years or more. The longer an investor holds onto a risky asset with at least a twenty year record of associated returns, the less chance there is of obtaining a poor cumulative return. The time series graph will show you the importance of time horizon and how it relates to risk and return. Select different time periods and see how it affects the distribution of returns.
      
Dimension 2: Attitude Toward Risk
The Attitude Toward Risk dimension estimates aversion or attraction to risk. Risk is defined as "the possibility of loss," and this category addresses the ability to stomach the inevitable decline of any investment subject to risk. If it never declines, there is no risk and therefore no reason for the investment to earn a return. High returns are not available without accepting high risk. A high score suggests a capacity of tolerating high risk investing to obtain the potential for higher returns. A low score indicates a risk aversion and the need to invest more conservatively. High risk attitudes are derived from individual personality, experience, gaming inclination, or a number of other factors. Of all the Risk Capacity™ dimensions, this is the most difficult to quantify, as it is an intangible quality. Figure 10-2 shows the relationship between risk attitude, time horizon, and optimal portfolios.


Figure 10-2  

      Dimension 3: Net Worth
The Net Worth dimension estimates capacity to take various levels of risk with investments. A high net worth provides a cushion for the uncertainty of future cash needs. Because life is a random walk, we are never certain of tomorrow’s requirements. The more assets there are in reserve, the higher one’s capacity is for risk. The higher the net worth, the higher the capacity for risk. (net worth calculator from dinkytown.net )
Also see (right click on link, then save target as, save to your Desktop) the Financial Summary and Planning Spreadsheet for both net worth and income statement creation and analysis. Call an Index Funds Advisor to assist you in filling it out: 888-643-313.
      Dimension 4: Income and Savings Rate
The Income and Savings Rate dimension estimates excess income and ability to add to savings. A high score indicates that a large percentage of income is discretionary and is available for investing. A low score indicates that all or almost all income is being used for ordinary expenses and not being added to annual investments. A higher income also adds to the cushion for surprise or emergency cash requirements. net income calculator Figure 10-3 shows the relationship between net worth, net income, and optimal portfolios. For a detailed analysis of retirement planning, see netirement.com.
Figure10-3
 

Dimension 5: Investment Knowledge
The Investment Knowledge dimension estimates an investor’s understanding of the 12-Step Program to Index Funds. A high score indicates a good understanding of Modern Portfolio Theory and the failure of active management. A low score indicates that a review of this 12-Step Program may be needed. See Figure 10-4.
Figure 10-4
 


How important is investment knowledge? A recent study of 401k plans highlighted the Causes of Low Returns for 401k Plan Participants:

"The low returns also reflect a number of inherent failings in 401(k) plans as currently structured, involving participants, plan sponsors and the law.
Problem: Lack of Knowledge.
Several studies find that many participants in defined contribution plans have an appalling lack of understanding of basic principles of investing. For example, a recent national survey of participants found:
1. Respondents generally considered company stock less risky than a diversified domestic equity portfolio.
2. 44 percent thought money market funds included stocks and 43
percent thought they also included bonds.
3. Nearly 20 percent didn.t know they could lose money in equities.
4. 65 percent didn.t know they could lose money in a bond fund and 60 percent didn't know they could lose money in a government bond fund.

Small wonder that so many participants in 401(k) plans have little or no grasp of the principles of prudent investing! They may have a limited or extensive list of funds from which to choose, but they base their selection on individual funds rather than investment strategy. The fund offerings may not stress the value of index funds, which invest in the stocks or bonds used to compute a particular index and have low management fees because they are not actively managed. Participants take too little risk, as in the case of those letting most of their assets stay in money market funds or cash, or too much risk, as in the case of those putting the great majority of their assets into high-tech stocks or funds. Many participants have an appalling lack of understanding of basic principles of investing." (Source: Reinventing Retirement Income in America by Brooks Hamilton and Scott Burns, NCPA Policy Report No. 248December 2001
Your investment returns are 100% explained by Risk Capacity™, because your capacity directs you to your proper risk exposure, also referred to as your asset allocation or investment policy. The result of a careful analysis of your Risk Capacity™ is a risk exposure that you can hold on to through thick and thin, or the ups and downs of the market. This minimizes transaction costs and optimizes long-term returns. When your Risk Capacity™ and your Risk Exposure are aligned, your returns are optimized .
10.3    Problems

10.3.1 Investors Do Not Properly Assess Risk Capacity™
 
The problem many investors face is the improper measurement of their Risk Capacity™. Each dimension has to be carefully examined and then quantified. Finally, some dimensions are more important than others, so they must carry more weight in the determination of a final score. As in any survey, the questions must be carefully designed, and the investor must be totally honest and accurate.
10.3.2 Risk Capacity™ Changes Over Time
The second problem investors face is that their Risk Capacity™ changes with time and circumstances, and they fail to recalibrate their capacity on an annual basis. Just as a portfolio needs rebalancing to maintain consistent risk exposure, the dimensions of Risk Capacity™ need to be remeasured to maintain a consistent Risk Capacity™ that matches the changing circumstances.
10.4    Solutions

10.4.1 The Risk Capacity™ Survey
The five dimensions of Risk Capacity™ are measured through a Risk Capacity™ survey that poses several questions to the investor. This survey is the single most important step of the investment planning process. Index Funds Advisors offers three surveys on their website at www.ifa.com. The complete survey includes forty-nine questions, the 401(k) survey has nineteen questions, and the quick survey is comprised of five questions. Based on the answers from the two longer surveys, a thorough analysis is generated. The quick survey is designed to provide an overview of the five dimensions and should not be relied on for determining asset allocation, unless the answers are discussed with an investment advisor. The quick survey asks the following five questions.   
1. Assume your investments do not increase in value. Within how many years do you plan to withdraw more than 20% of all your investments?
a. less than 2 years
b. more than 2 but less than 5 years
c. more than 5 but less than 7 years
d. more than 7 but less than 10 years
e. more than 10 years
2. What is the current value of your long-term investments? Please include your retirement savings plan with your employer and your individual retirement accounts (IRAs.)
a. Less than $25,000
b. $25,000 to $49,999
c. $50,000 to $99,999
d. $100,000 to $249,999
e. $250,000 or more
3. What is your total annual income after the deduction of taxes?
a. Less than $50,000
b. $50,000 to $74,999
c. $75,000 to $99,999
d. $100,000 to $199,999
e. $200,000 or more
4. What is the worst twelve month unrealized percentage loss you would tolerate for your long-term investments?
a. -33%
b. -26%
c. -18%
d. -9.5%
e. Zero; any loss is unacceptable to me
5. How would you rate your knowledge about investing in general and more specifically, the relationship between risk, return, and time?
a. significantly below average
b. below average
c. average
d. above averagee. expert
The total score of a survey is the sum of the scores in each category, each weighted by its estimated contribution to overall capacity. Higher scores point toward higher risk, higher returns, higher volatility, lower-liquidity, and longer-term investments. These would include a larger allocation of Small Capitalization, Value, International and Emerging Market Indexes. A weighted total score of 100 indicates the highest capacity for risk. On the other hand, lower scores would match up to portfolios with lower risk, lower returns, lower volatility and higher liquidity. These would include shorter-term investments such as fixed-income. Take the Risk Capacity Survey here.


دانلود با لینک مستقیم


ریسک و بازده

مقاله ترجمه شده حسابداری با عنوان حسابداری در جامعه الکترونیکی

اختصاصی از فی موو مقاله ترجمه شده حسابداری با عنوان حسابداری در جامعه الکترونیکی دانلود با لینک مستقیم و پر سرعت .

مقاله ترجمه شده حسابداری با عنوان حسابداری در جامعه الکترونیکی


مقاله ترجمه شده حسابداری با عنوان حسابداری در جامعه الکترونیکی

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

مقاله ترجمه شده حسابداری با عنوان حسابداری در جامعه الکترونیکی در فرمت ورد و شامل ترجمه مقاله انگلیسی GUEST EDITORIAL Online reporting: accounting in cybersociety می باشد.


دانلود با لینک مستقیم


مقاله ترجمه شده حسابداری با عنوان حسابداری در جامعه الکترونیکی

مقاله مدیریت ترجمه شده با عنوان استدلال مدیران

اختصاصی از فی موو مقاله مدیریت ترجمه شده با عنوان استدلال مدیران دانلود با لینک مستقیم و پر سرعت .

مقاله مدیریت ترجمه شده با عنوان استدلال مدیران


مقاله مدیریت ترجمه شده با عنوان استدلال مدیران

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

مقاله مدیریت ترجمه شده با عنوان استدلال مدیران در فرمت ورد و شامل ترجمه متن زیر می باشد:

Secret of Success: As Christensen's Paradox testifies, finding the secret of success takes more than textbook management
Nov 2003
Robert Heller
Medieval man searched for the philosopher's stone that could turn base metal into gold. Managers and entrepreneurs often follow a similar, usually vain hope. But it needn't be vain, judged by the results of companies in one industry. They achieved $62 billion in sales in 1976-1994, twenty times the figure for rivals which hadn't found the stone.

If that isn't convincing enough, sales per firm in the lagging group only averaged a cumulative $64.5 million: the successes averaged $1.9 billion - a difference of 29 times. The statistics come from a truly remarkable management book by Clayton M. Christensen. Its explicit title, The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail, does less than justice to its message, which applies to all managements and all companies all the time - and not only to innovators.

The philosopher's stone in the statistics cited above, however, is innovation in 'disruptive technologies'. The successes 'sought growth by entering small emerging markets'. The back-markers, in contrast, pursued growth in large markets. Both groups took risks. The winners took the chance that an emerging market for the disruptive technology might not appear at all. The losers accepted the competitive risk of battling against established companies in established markets - and the first lesson is that this is fundamentally poor strategy.

MANAGEMENT PARADOX
The book's wholly convincing thesis, however, is that large companies are locked into this mode. They are forced by customer demands and competitive pressures to invest heavily to sustain their existing strengths and, if possible, to enhance that prowess. This gives rise to Christensen's Paradox. The conventional explanation when great firms stumble is that they suffer from 'incompetence, bureaucracy, arrogance, tired executive blood, poor planning, and short-term investment horizons.' The Paradox, however, states that large companies fail, absolutely or relatively, in face of disruptive technologies, not because they are poorly managed, but because their management is excellent.

So how did the failures lose leadership to the new disruptive technologies? It was because they did exactly what any business school professor would be happy to recommend:

1. Listen to your customers.
2. Invest aggressively in new technologies that will meet those customers' rising demands for performance.
3. Carefully study and meet market trends.
4. Allocate resources to investments promising the best returns.

The author, an assistant professor at Harvard Business School, gives example after example from disk drives, computers, retailing, steel-making, earth-moving equipment, etc. to show how this good management can't cope with a disruptive technology; one which introduces a different category of customers. Typically, these are attracted by lower prices and by different functionality that together help to generate new types of product. Equally typically, the disruptive innovators break all the four rules of good management cited above:

1. They don't listen to customers, because they don't have any.
2. They develop lower-performance products instead of higher.
3. They don't rely on market research, because it's useless in these circumstances.
4. They head off into tiny markets, with sales ranging from zero to insignificant.

Yet they win and win big, like the successes quoted at the start. The industry concerned is disk drives. The strategy of the 14-inch drive industry sums up Christensen's thesis. The manufacturers went to very great lengths, technically and financially, to satisfy the customers, who all made mainframe computers. The 8-inch drives introduced by newcomers like Shugart, Priam and Quantum were no use to these customers.

The disks found their market with mini-computers - then a minute segment. As the segment grew, however, and as the 8-inch disks caught up with the performance of lower-end 14-inch models, so the latter's makers began to lose out. Yet two-thirds of the 14-inchers never introduced an 8-inch model. Those that did were around two years late, and ultimately every 14-inch drive maker was driven from the industry.

To repeat, this wasn't because of any real management incompetence, but because of its opposite. The 8-inch drives offered smaller margins and a far smaller market, and the customers didn't want them. The book firmly establishes the concept of 'value networks', in which customers and supplier develop a shared interest in a given technology which suits both their purposes - including their profit objectives. The folly of ignoring the new emerging market is only clear in hindsight.

UP-MARKET PROFITS
At the time, dismissal of the down-market potential was true wisdom: that way, neither profit nor revenues lay in wait. Going up-market, however, offered both. Here again is the standard business school and industry lesson. Every manager is urged to head for the top left-hand corner of the price/performance matrix, where you win the highest price for the highest quality. That optimises the present - but may undermine, and even eliminate, the future.

To express the position another way, firms and individuals naturally play to their strengths - what they are good at, which has worked well in the past and still works well. The time comes, however, when these strengths are threatened by obsolescence - even though they are still paying off.

That was IBM's recurrent nightmare. The company may have deserved its sky-high management reputation, at least in part, but it derived its vast profits and massive market strength from serving large corporate customers. Although it eventually reacted very effectively to the rise of both the minicomputer and the PC, its natural bent was towards those same customers. But the phenomenal growth in PC sales lay outside the large corporates - and IBM's market share, once 80%, slumped to single figures.

Again, this isn't a failing peculiar to IBM. In disk drives, Seagate, the 5.25-inch leader, came late into 3.5-inch disks - and by 1991 hadn't sold a single product to what turned out to be their prime users, manufacturers of portable, laptop and notebook computers. So there is everybody's problem. The biggest opportunity and the greatest threat may well lie outside your existing business and value network. You can't, however, just abandon the latter, because that network provides your current highly satisfactory profits.

The whole organisation, and the management mind-set, are geared, quite rightly, to what is. How can the same organisation react effectively to what isn't - and may never be? Christensen's unequivocal answer is that it can't. The existing organisation will never suceed with a disruptive technology. The book cites Woolworth in the US, which attempted to combat the discount stores by opening its own Woolco outlets and simultaneously expanding the traditional variety stores.

The effort failed even more abysmally than IBM's move to absorb its phenomenally succesful PC operation into the mainstream organisation. The Woolcos disappeared completely. IBM, as noted, lost massive amounts of market share. Yet originally the PC operation was a model response to the innovator's dilemma. It's a solution that I've advocated for many years, and to which Christensen's meticulous studies give added force.

KEY PRESCRIPTIONS
The PC activity was sited well away from any other IBM centre, in Boca Raton, Florida, under independent management with a distinct mandate. It met excellently most of the book's key prescriptions:

1. Match the size of the organisation to the size of the market.
2. Learn about the market and its customers as you go along.
3. Get in early, while the market has still to be proved.
4. Accept the inevitability of mistakes.
5. Recognise the weaknesses of disruptive technologies and their strengths.

This sounds like an argument for the 'skunk works', an R&D organisation given a specific task and located in a site which makes interference unlikely. Many a skunk-works failed, however, usually because either the sponsoring management didn't have real faith in the project, or the R&D wasn't linked to manufacture and marketing. The catastrophic failure of Xerox to exploit any of the brilliant, epoch-making PC discoveries at its Palo Alto Research Center sprang from separation of the scientists from manufacturing and marketing.

There's an apparent contradiction between what happened to PARC and the argument for siting new activities well away from existing ones. But it is only apparent: the spun-off activity should be a fully integrated operation, not (like PARC) a self-contained outfit with no commercial affiliations. Without a sponsor, even brilliant research and development will be lost. Even with a sponsor, though, the independent operation may not produce the right disruptive technology or market it appropriately to the different categories of customers who become involved.

The innovators have to learn how to play from weakness. Since they can't compete with the established business for the established customers, and initally have little or no idea of where their products will sell, they have to create new strength. They have to learn how to find new customers and open up new markets - from which brilliant success can spring. That, however, doesn't makes it any easier to encompass disruptive change when those markets, in turn, become established.

What happened to the 14-inch disk drive makers was repeated again and again every time a generation of new boy entrepreneurs reduced disk sizes. The rich old boys proved incapable of resisting the competition, even though it used the identical approach that had made their own wealth (and killed their competition). The main antidote is to accept that in every business disruptive technologies or the equivalent lie in wait - developments which will one day enlarge and upset the market to your disadvantage.

One of Britain's classic entrepreneurial success stories, that of J. C. Bamford, came from disruption. In 1947 Joe Bamford produced the very first hydraulic excavator - a little machine, designed to go on the back of tractors, that was entirely unsuitable for the major construction jobs. These were dominated by cable-actuated systems.

DIDN'T NEED, COULDN'T USE
Their makers studied the hydraulic newcomers, but, to quote Christensen, 'Hydraulics was a technology that their customers didn't need - indeed couldn't use.' When hydraulic machines could finally match cable, it was too late for the cable champions to react. JCB and the other hydraulic manufacturers took most of the market. In the process, Joe and his son Sir Anthony took sales to great heights: £700 million in 1995. Their combined fortunes, created by a company that remained resolutely private, hit £800 million in 1996.

At the start, the main strength of challengers like the Bamfords lies in their highly adaptive approach. In these disruptive businesses, with their uncertain markets, there is no alternative to the points made earlier: to learn as you go along, and to make false starts and mistakes, but react swiftly until you find the better path. For perfectly sound reasons, big companies discipline this behaviour out of existence in their mainstream operations. That's why, as IBM showed, by far the best way for them to avoid the 14-inch fate is to establish and finance some imitation start-ups themselves - independent outfits that can attack small emerging markets in the style of small emerging companies.

That style involves eight principles that separate the winners from the also-rans, and the corpocrats from the entrepreneurs. The Opportunity Octet is highly valuable in any business, but in start-ups it is decisive. Winners in the start-up stakes....

1. Reward risk-taking and don't punish failure
2. Give new ideas top, top priority
3. Allow those ideas to develop freely
4. Put great performance above good order
5. Compete fiercely with themselves
6. Enlist professional managers in good time
7. Share financial rewards widely and richly
8. Go for market share first and foremost

Much of the Octet (derived from a Business Week study of Silicon Valley) has been strongly advised for all managers in Thinking Managers. Out of sheer necessity, the IT whiz-kids have been forced to abandon traditional, hierarchical ways and have learnt to live with chaos in the interests of 'super-speed and can-do culture.' That pair form the pure milk of entrepreneurism, which produces an unprecedented flow of cream in the hands of unconventional managements.

Thus, to gain its potent market position on the Internet (8) start-up Netscape famously just gave away its browsers. You simply have to forget old inhibitions. For instance, competing with yourself (2) means not being afraid to cannibalise your existing products: if you don't eat your children, someone else will. Seagate's Al Shugart, the ace entrepreneur of the disk drive, is only half-joking: 'Sometimes I think we'll see the day when you introduce a product in the morning and announce its end of life at the end of the day.'

FOUR DIFFERENCES
The Opportunity Octet are tactical necessities. But they should rest on four strategic principles which mark out winning strategies from the runners-up and flops. Winners concentrate on the winning hand; cover every bet; work with strong partners; and think really big. A wondrous example of big thinking is Finland's Nokia, whose cellular phone technology has taken it to a market value of $9 billion. Once the Finns had spotted their winning opportunity in the cellular potential, they poured in resources to achieve a quarter of world phone sales.

That meant intense concentration. For the sake of cellular, Nokia abandoned paper, tyres, metals, other electronics, cables, TV sets and its PC interests - sold to ICL. That tight focus, however, is only part of the story. It won't save you from Christensen's Paradox. That's where covering every bet comes in. The failed market leaders trapped by the Paradox actually saw that necessity - they not only developed the disruptive technologies themselves, but often took the development to the point of a business proposal. But it never made economic sense to take the technology to market - not within the established organisation. So don't try.

Independent start-ups are not the only answer. You can also take partners. The Silicon Valley giants have formed the good habit of investing in small start-ups that have promising ideas. Cisco Systems has bought or invested in 34 of them in three years: Intel has set aside $500 million for similar purposes. If the investment succeeds with a new technology, the investor is in on the ground floor; if the start-up succeeds financially, the investor cashes in; and the odds are, of course, that technological and financial breakthroughs will go hand-in-hand.

If the 14-inch drive makers had invested in the 8-inch disrupters, the leaders wouldn't have lost out - provided, of course, that they had allowed the challengers to follow their own logic. Hewlett-Packard did precisely that when setting free a new organisation to make ink-jet printers that would challenge its own immensely profitable position in laser printers. The disruptive technology then worked to H-P's overall advantage and followed the logic of Christensen's Paradox. Anything else invites eventual disruption by others - followed, if you're 14-inched, by destruction.


دانلود با لینک مستقیم


مقاله مدیریت ترجمه شده با عنوان استدلال مدیران